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Abstract
While filing for bankruptcy does not seem appealing for any
debtor regardless of the jurisdiction, the reluctance to use the
bankruptcy system varies across countries. This article explores
the underlying reasons and economic effects of the low usage of
bankruptcy procedures in Spain, where the rate of business
bankruptcies is one of the lowest in the world. Some authors have
argued that the low usage of bankruptcy procedures in Spain is
due to a “cultural” problem faced by Spanish entrepreneurs.
According to this hypothesis, the lack of a “bankruptcy culture”
makes Spanish entrepreneurs afraid to use the bankruptcy system.
In this article, however, I advocate for a totally different
hypothesis. In my opinion, the low rate of business bankruptcies
in Spain is not due to a “cultural” problem but to an institutional
one. Namely, I argue that the low rate of business bankruptcies is
better explained by the unattractive insolvency regime for debtors
and creditors traditionally existing in Spain, as well as other legal
and institutional factors including a creditor-friendly corporate
law, an efficient mortgage system, a rigid labor law, and a poor
law of secured transactions. All these factors encourage both
debtors and creditors to avoid the use of insolvency proceedings
either by minimizing the risk of insolvency or by postponing—and,
if possible, even avoiding—the bankruptcy system once a debtor
becomes insolvent. By exploring the underlying reasons for the
low usage of the bankruptcy system in Spain, this article seeks to
contribute to the general understanding of the low rate of business
bankruptcies around the world while assessing the economic
effects potentially associated with a low usage of insolvency
proceedings. The article concludes with several recommendations
to enhance the attractiveness of Spanish bankruptcy procedures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Insolvency law may have a significant impact on entrepreneurship,
innovation and firms’ access to finance.2 Therefore, from a policy
perspective, it seems particularly relevant to analyze the operation of a
bankruptcy system as a means to determine its potential impact on the real
economy.3 In that context, a high or low usage of the bankruptcy system
is not necessarily good or bad for society. It will depend on the underlying
reasons associated with the use of bankruptcy procedures.4
As shown in Table 1, Spain has one of the lowest business bankruptcy
rates in the world (that is, the number of business bankruptcies per number
of firms). For instance, in 2006, while there were 2.6 business bankruptcies
per 10,000 firms in Spain, other developed economies such as Italy, the
United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, or France exhibited a
number of business bankruptcies of 25.5, 33.5, 96.3, 114.7 and 178.6,
respectively, per 10,000 firms. The low rate of business bankruptcies in
Spain increased in 2010, as a result of the Spanish economic crisis.
However, as it is shown, even in the middle of one of the harshest
economic crises in the history of the country, the rate of business

2

Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, in
THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE 215-244 (Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth Froot and
Jeffrey Sachs eds., Chicago University Press, Volume 2, 2004); Rafael La Porta, Florencio
López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 53 J. OF FIN. 1131 (1997); Jeremy Berkowitz & Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy
and Small Firms’ Access to Credit, 35 RAND J. ECON. 69 (2004); Kenneth Ayotte,
Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 161
(2007); John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship, 10
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 303 (2008); Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy
Codes Matter? A Study of Default in France, Germany and the UK, 63 J. OF FIN. 565
(2008); Viral V. Acharya & Krishnamurthy Subramanian, Bankruptcy Codes and
Innovation, 22 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 4949 (2009); Viral V. Acharya, Rangarajan K.
Sundaram & Kose John, Cross-Country Variations in Capital Structures: The Role of
Bankruptcy Codes, 20 J. OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION 25 (2011); John Armour, Antonia
Menezes, Mahesh Uttamchandani, & Kristin van Zwieten, How do Creditor Rights Matter
for Debt Finance? A Review of Empirical Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURED
FINANCING OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 3–25 (Frederique Dahan ed., Edward Elgar,
2015).
3
While the expressions ‘bankruptcy law’ and ‘bankruptcy procedures’ are generally used
in the United States, most countries around the world use the words ‘insolvency law’ and
‘insolvency proceedings’, respectively. Actually, some of these latter countries only use
the word ‘bankruptcy’ to refer to personal insolvency. This paper will use the words
‘bankruptcy procedures’ and ‘bankruptcy law’ and ‘insolvency proceedings’ and
‘insolvency law’, respectively, as synonyms.
4
For the pioneer study in this field, see Stijn Claessens & Leora F. Klapper, Bankruptcy
around the World: Explanations of Its Relative Use, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 253 (2005).
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bankruptcies in Spain remained lower than most of its European
counterparties.
Table 1. Bankruptcy procedures per 10,000 firms
Country

2006

2010

Spain

2.6

14.6

Portugal

15

37.4

Italy

25.5

25.3

United States

33.5

97.8

Finland

96.6

105.9

Germany

96.3

89.1

United Kingdom

114.7

137.3

Hungary

135

305.3

France

178.6

216.6

Austria

239.8

212.2

Belgium

107.2

124.1

Source: Miguel García-Posada and Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, El uso de los concursos
de acreedores en España, Banco de España (2012)

While Spain exhibits one of the world’s lowest business bankruptcy
rates, the low usage of bankruptcy procedures is not just a Spanish
phenomenon. Other studies have shown that entrepreneurs do not often
use the bankruptcy system in other jurisdictions, particularly in Asia and
Latin America.5 Therefore, by exploring the reasons and potential
implications of the low usage of bankruptcy procedures in Spain, this
paper seeks to contribute to the general understanding of the relative use
of bankruptcy law as well as the economic effects potentially associated
with a lower usage of the insolvency system.6
5

Id. at 261; Liu Mingkang & Wei Chuyi, Towards a Better Future for Chinese Bankruptcy
Law: Problems and Potential, LAU CHOR TAK INST. OF GLOBAL ECON. & FIN., (Dec. 2017),
http://www.igef.cuhk.edu.hk/igef_media/workingpaper/IGEF/igef%20working%20paper%20no.%2062%20english%20version.pdf.
6
For a first attempt to explore the low rate of business bankruptcy in Spain, see Marco
Celentani, Miguel García-Posada & Fernando Gómez, The Spanish Business Bankruptcy
Puzzle and the Crisis 1 (FUNDACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA, Working Paper
NO. 2010-11, Mar. 2010). For further studies mainly analyzing the impact of the mortgage
system on the use of bankruptcy procedures in Spain, see Miguel García-Posada,
Insolvency Institutions and Efficiency: The Case of Spain (BANCO DE ESPAÑA WORKING
PAPERS NO. 1302, 2013); see also Miguel García-Posada & Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, Are
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Some authors have previously argued that the low usage of bankruptcy
procedures in Spain is due to a lack of a “bankruptcy culture”. In other
words, they argue that entrepreneurs do not often have the reorganization
culture existing in other countries, and they are afraid of using the
bankruptcy system. Against this hypothesis, this article argues that the low
rate of business bankruptcy in Spain is not due to a cultural problem but
to an institutional one. Namely, it will be argued that the low rate of
business bankruptcies is better explained by the unattractive insolvency
regime traditionally existing in Spain, as well as other legal and
institutional factors including a creditor-friendly corporate law, an
efficient mortgage system, a rigid labor law, and a poor law of secured
transactions. All these factors encourage debtors and creditors to avoid the
use of insolvency proceedings by either minimizing the risk of insolvency
(e.g., reducing the level of debt or risk taking borne by a company) or by
postponing—and, if possible, even avoiding—the bankruptcy system once
a debtor becomes insolvent.
The paper is divided as follows. Section II analyzes the relative use of
bankruptcy procedures, examining the role of insolvency law in the
promotion of economic growth. Section III explains why the low rate of
business bankruptcies in Spain is probably due to an unattractive
insolvency system, as well as other legal and institutional factors including
a creditor-friendly corporate law, a rigid labor law, and a poor law of
secured transactions. Section IV proposes some policy recommendations
to enhance the attractiveness of the institutional framework for debtors and
creditors in Spain. Section V concludes.

II. THE RELATIVE USE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
a. The role of bankruptcy law in the promotion of economic
growth
The law and finance literature has shown the importance that the
protection of creditors’ and shareholders’ rights may have for the
promotion of firms’ access to finance and the development of capital
markets.7 For that purpose, most studies have measured the degree of
there alternatives to bankruptcy? A study of small businesses distress in Spain, 5 J. OF THE
SPANISH ECON. ASS’N 287 (2014).
7
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. OF FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio
López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. OF POL.
ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
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shareholder protection based on several indexes related to the allocation
of powers between directors and shareholders.8 In contrast, the level of
creditor protection has been traditionally measured as the result of a
country’s bankruptcy and secured transaction laws, as well as the quality
and efficiency of the mechanisms for debt enforcement.9
The level of creditor protection in bankruptcy depends on a variety of
factors, including: (i) whether the law provides (or not) an automatic stay;
(i) who should (or is allowed to) file for reorganization or liquidation; and
(iii) the weight given to the debtor, the creditors, and the company´s
managers in bankruptcy.10
Even though there might be a disagreement about what to understand
as an ‘optimal’ bankruptcy law, most authors seem to agree that a good
insolvency regime should promote both ex ante and ex post efficiency.11
Ex ante efficiency can be achieved if an insolvency regime creates the
rights incentives to promote entrepreneurship and access to finance.
Likewise, ex post efficiency in bankruptcy can be achieved if the debtor´s
assets are put to their best use, and therefore the creditors can maximize
their returns.

8

Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. OF POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection
Around the World, 33 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 111 (2008); John Armour, Simon Deakin,
Viviana Mollica & Mathias Siems, Law and Financial Development: What We Are
Learning From Time Series Evidence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1435 (2009).
9
For a general overview of variables regarding creditor protection in bankruptcy, see
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. OF POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Vaughn H. Armstrong & Leigh A. Riddick,
Bankruptcy Law Differences Across Countries, Managerial Incentives and Firm Value
(SSRN
WORKING
PAPER,
Jan.
2003),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=420560; Sergei A. Davydenko &
Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Default in France, Germany
and the UK, 63 J. OF FIN. 565 (2008); Viral V. Acharya, Yakov Amihud & Lubomir Litov,
Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-Taking (NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, 15569),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15569.pdf; Viral V. Acharya & Krishnamurthy
Subramanian, Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation, 22 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 4949 (2009);
John Armour, Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica & Mathias Siems, Law and Financial
Development: What We Are Learning From Time Series Evidence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1435
(2009). For a study analyzing the importance of debt enforcement from a comparative
perspective, see Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Carale McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Debt
Enforcement Around the World, 116 J. OF POL. ECON. 1105 (2008).
10
Id.
11
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.
OF L., ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Using Options to Divide Value in
Corporate Bankruptcy, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 829 (2000); Oliver Hart, Different Approaches
to
Bankruptcy
(NBER
WORKING
PAPER
NO.
7921,
2000),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7921.pdf.

2020

THE LOW USAGE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES

281

While most empirical studies have focused their attention on the
impact of insolvency law on firms’ access to finance,12 and therefore on
the capital structure of firms, bankruptcy law has also proven to affect
innovation, entrepreneurship, and the asset structures of firms.13 For
example, in a country with a poor creditor protection in bankruptcy,
lenders may respond ex ante by requiring more collateral.14 Therefore,
firms may have incentives to invest (or over-invest) in non-specific assets
that can be easily given as debt collateral. As a result, the design of
insolvency law may ultimately affect the level of innovation and type of
assets potentially held by most companies in a country.15 Moreover, since
these assets may be less risky than non-tangible assets, this particular asset
structure may reduce the risk of insolvency of a firm. Therefore, an
institutional factor (e.g., poor creditor protection in bankruptcy) may
ultimately lead to an economic problem (e.g., lack of innovation) that
might be reflected in a low number of business bankruptcies.
This paper does not argue that a high number of business bankruptcies
is necessarily good. In fact, a high rate of business bankruptcies can be
equally undesirable, not only for the destruction of value potentially
generated ex post, but also for other factors potentially associated with the
design of the insolvency framework. For example, if the high rate of
business bankruptcies is the result of an excessively debtor-oriented
jurisdiction where creditors are not adequately protected, lenders might
respond ex ante by increasing the cost of debt (including requiring more
collateral) and being more reluctant to lend money.16 Therefore, the higher
12

See John Armour, Antonia Menezes, Mahesh Uttamchandani & Kristin van Zwieten,
How do Creditor Rights Matter for Debt Finance? A Review of Empirical Evidence, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURED FINANCING OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 3–25
(Frederique Dahan ed., Edward Elgar, 2015) (summarizing the empirical literature
analyzing the impact of creditor protection and insolvency reforms on firms’ access to
finance).
13
See generally Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know about Capital
Structure? Some Evidence from International Data, 50 THE J. OF FIN. 1421 (1995); see also
Viral V. Acharya, Rangarajan K. Sundaram & Kose John, Cross-Country Variations in
Capital Structures: The Role of Bankruptcy Codes, 20 J. OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION 25
(2011).
14
Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of
Default in France, Germany and the UK, 63 THE J. OF FIN. 565, 566 (2008).
15
See Marco Celentani, Miguel García-Posada & Fernando Gómez, The Spanish Business
Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis (FUNDACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA,
Working Paper NO. 2010-11, Mar. 2010); see also Miguel García-Posada, Insolvency
Institutions and Efficiency: The Case of Spain (BANCO DE ESPAÑA WORKING PAPERS NO.
1302, 2013).
16
See Davydenko & Franks, supra note 2. Actually, this seems to be the case of France (a
country with a high rate of business bankruptcies, as shown in Table 1). Miguel GarcíaPosada & Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, El uso de los concursos de acreedores en España,
BANCO DE ESPAÑA tbl. 1 (2012).
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or lower usage of the bankruptcy system is not necessarily good or bad for
society. It will depend on the underlying reasons supporting these data.
In a seminal work about the relative use of bankruptcy law around the
world, Claessens and Klapper showed three primary findings.17 First, the
number of business bankruptcies are higher in common-law countries with
market-oriented financial systems. Second, greater judicial efficiency is
associated with a higher use of bankruptcy, though – interestingly- the
combination of stronger creditors’ rights and greater judicial efficiency is
associated with a lower use of the bankruptcy system. Third, the presence
of an automatic stay for secured creditors (which, at first glance, might
seem an undesirable policy for secured creditors, who might be interested
in enforcing their claims and taking back their collateral, unless they are
out of the money), is associated with a higher use of bankruptcy.
Therefore, since the findings were a bit unclear, the authors concluded that
the relationship between creditor rights and the use of bankruptcy systems
is more complex than it may be previously thought.
Likewise, other authors have focused their attention on the trade-off
between ex ante and ex post efficiency, and the role of third parties
(usually judges and/or insolvency practitioners) in the overall efficiency
of bankruptcy procedures.18 And as these factors may affect the
attractiveness of the insolvency system, they can ultimately have an effect
on the higher or lower usage of bankruptcy procedures.
Namely, it has been argued that bankruptcy law either allocates
significant control rights to third parties or allows them to mediate in the
allocation of these rights to debtors and creditors. Thus, by using third
parties as a credible channel for providing information, both debtors and
creditors may enhance ex post efficiency.19 Nevertheless, the ability of
these third parties to enhance ex post efficiency –without undermining ex
ante efficiency– depends on their ability to determine whether the
company´s assets are worth more as a going concern or in a piecemeal
liquidation.20 In other words, the desirability of the intervention of these
third parties will depend on their ability to minimize the so-called type I
and type II errors, that is, those errors associated with: (i) maintaining a
firm as a going concern when it is worth more in a piecemeal liquidation
(type I error); and (ii) liquidating piecemeal a firm that is worth more as a

17

See Stijn Claessens & Leora F. Klapper, Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of
Its Relative Use, 7 AM. L. AND ECON. REV. 253 (2005).
18
See Kenneth Ayotte & Hayong Yun, Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments,
25 THE J. OF L., ECON. & ORG. 1 (2007).
19
Id.
20
See id.
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going concern (type II error).21 Based on these arguments, the authors
conclude that the optimal trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency
in the design of bankruptcy law depends on the ability and expertise of
these third parties to efficiently assign control rights in bankruptcy.22 If
these parties have the authority and expertise to (promptly) separate viable
and non-viable firms, bankruptcy law should make use of their abilities to
promote ex post efficiency. By contrast, when judges and/or insolvency
practitioners have low abilities in discerning viable and non-viable firms,
it might make sense for the legislator to favor ex ante efficiency, and
therefore to design a more creditor-oriented bankruptcy law.23 Finally, and
perhaps more importantly for the purpose of this paper, the authors
conclude that when bankruptcy codes do not provide enough creditor
protection to achieve ex post efficiency, lenders have incentives to write
their contracts to resolve financial distress outside of bankruptcy.24
Therefore, a poor creditor protection in bankruptcy can be ultimately
associated with a low usage of bankruptcy procedures.

21

Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11
Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructuring, 10 THE J. OF L., ECON. & ORG. 268,
269 (1994) (using the term ‘type I’ and ‘type II’ errors). See also Michelle J. White, The
costs of corporate bankruptcy: A U.S.-European comparison, in CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 467-500 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari &
Lawrence A. Weiss eds., Cambridge University Press 1996).
22
Kenneth Ayotte & Hayong Yun, Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments, 25
THE J. OF L., ECON. & ORG. 1 (2007).
23
Id.
24
See Michelle White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. OF FIN. PERSPECTIVES 129
(1989); Douglas Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and
Economics of Financially Distressed Firms 9–10 (CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW &
ECONOMICS 1, 1997); John Armour, The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A
Review, 3–4 (ESRC CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,
WORKING PAPER NO 197, 2001); Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Corporate
Bankruptcy, 91 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1199 (2005). For the purpose of this paper, financial
distress means any situation in which the debtor is unable to pay its debts as they become
due. Therefore, it is a problem necessarily held by leveraged firms, since it implies the
existence of debt, and it can be solved by restructuring the capital structure of the firm.
This concept must be distinguished from economic distress, which is generally used to
refer to those companies whose assets are worth more in a piecemeal liquidation or below
zero at their current use. See also United Airlines, Inc. v HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d
609, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “many provisions in the US Bankruptcy Code
(…) are designed to distinguish financial from economic distress. A firm that cannot meet
its debts as they come due, but has a positive cash flow from current operations, is in
financial but not economic distress. It is carrying too much debt, which can be written down
in a reorganization. A firm with a negative cash flow, by contrast, is in economic distress
and liquidation may be the best option”).
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b. The low use of bankruptcy procedures: reasons and
explanations
Firms can avoid the use of the bankruptcy system in two primary
ways: (i) by avoiding ex ante the risk of insolvency; or (ii) by resolving ex
post the debtor´s financial trouble without using formal bankruptcy
procedures. Therefore, as it will be mentioned, this reluctance to the use
of bankruptcy procedures can be due to a variety of factors.

i.

How companies can avoid the bankruptcy system

There are several strategies to minimize ex ante the risk of insolvency.
The most extreme ones include not starting a new business or, if so, not
taking any risks and not borrowing money.25 However, while these
measures would reduce the risk of insolvency, and therefore the likelihood
of bearing the direct and indirect costs associated with a situation of
insolvency, they can harm entrepreneurship, innovation, and access to
financing.26
Instead of, or along with, minimizing ex ante the risk of insolvency, a
firm might decide to take on optimal levels of risk and debt but, once it
becomes insolvent, avoid the use of the bankruptcy system. They can do
so in different ways. First, once a company faces financial trouble, secured
creditors may use the mortgage system, rather than the bankruptcy system,
to enforce their claims. Under this alternative, the secured creditors may
seize some of the most valuable assets of the firm, usually hampering the
firm’s ability to keep operating. Therefore, the company will probably end
up in a piecemeal liquidation where going concern value might be lost.
Therefore, this scenario not only can be undesirable for entrepreneurship,
job creation and the efficient allocation of assets, but also to promote
firms’ access to finance since the pie available for the creditors can be
reduced and they might respond ex ante with an increase in the cost of
debt.
Second, other companies may decide to shut down their businesses
without following a formal procedure. Under this option, the company
would do nothing but just wait and see if the creditors exercise any legal
actions against the company or the directors. If not, the company may stay
legally alive for a long period of time, even if it has no economic activity.
Again, this scenario can also destroy value. Some firms may decide to shut
25

Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, EL DERECHO CONCURSAL EN
ESTRUCTURALES Y PROPUESTA DE REFORMA, 8 (Reus, 2018).

26

Id.

ESPAÑA: PROBLEMAS
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down their businesses just because, despite the fact of being economically
viable, they may have become insolvent and they are afraid of using the
bankruptcy system. As a result, going concern value can be lost, and only
those creditors who are either sophisticated or closer enough to the debtor
may recover part of their claims if they quickly initiate legal actions
against the company.
Finally, firms can avoid ex post the bankruptcy system by using
workouts as a mechanism to sort out their financial trouble. Under this
scenario, if a viable but insolvent firm reaches an out-of-court agreement,
this option can save the direct and indirect costs associated with
bankruptcy procedures. Therefore, not only will the debtor suffer a lower
destruction of value but there will also be a bigger pie available for the
creditors. As a result, this scenario will be ex post efficient without
harming ex ante efficiency since the debtor did not take a suboptimal level
of risk or debt as a means to reduce the risk of insolvency.

ii.

Why companies may want to avoid the bankruptcy
system

Many authors and experts in Spain have pointed out that the low usage
of bankruptcy procedures is due to a cultural problem.27 Specifically, they
argue that the lack of an entrepreneurial and bankruptcy “culture”
discourages many companies from using the bankruptcy system in Spain.
While this “cultural” or “sociological” explanation for the low use of
bankruptcy procedures seems to have some support, not only in Spain but
also abroad,28 this paper provides an alternative explanation for the
understanding of the relative use of bankruptcy. In my opinion, even
though the reluctance to insolvency proceedings may indeed exist, this is
not the result of any cultural or sociological factors but the product of an
unattractive institutional framework for debtors and creditors. This
hypothesis will be detailed in section IV. Before getting into the details of
this explanation, however, it would be useful to provide a general
overview about the legal and institutional framework to deal with financial
distress in Spain.

27

For a summary of the authors supporting this hypothesis, see Gurrea-Martinez, El
Derecho concursal (2018) supra note 25, at 43–44.
28
Tibor Tajti, Bankruptcy stigma and the second chance policy: the impact of bankruptcy
stigma on business restructurings in China, Europe and the United States, 6 CHINA-EU
L.J. 3, 1 (2018).
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III. TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION OF THE LOW USE OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES IN SPAIN
a.

The unattractiveness of Spanish insolvency proceedings

Unlike other insolvency systems, which might be classified as ‘debtorfriendly’ or ‘creditor-friendly’, the Spanish insolvency has been classified
as anti-creditor and anti-debtor.29 From the debtor’s perspective, debtors
are exposed to a very harsh liability regime under Spanish bankruptcy law.
First, the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 establishes the old-fashioned
‘labelling’ of debtors mentioned above, by which debtors might end up
being classified as ‘guilty’ even if they show that the situation of
insolvency was generated or exacerbated by reasons totally unrelated to
the debtor´s actions. Second, the directors, under some circumstances,
might be liable for the company´s unpaid debts, in addition to being
disqualified. Third, debtors do not enjoy a cross-class cramdown for the
approval of reorganization plans. Fourth, debtors are always subject to the
supervision of a trustee and pay for the honorarium of these professionals.
Fifth, the Spanish insolvency proceeding is very formalistic not only in the
sense that most actions from the debtor require approval by the trustee
and/or the bankruptcy judge, but also by the fact that certain solutions
potentially adopted to turn around the company (e.g., certain M&A
transactions) are often discouraged. Finally, individual debtors do not
enjoy an effective discharge of debts, since they are not allowed to
discharge most of their debts, including those held by secured creditors
and certain preferential creditors (e.g., public creditors).
While the Spanish insolvency regime does not look very attractive to
debtors, it does not get much better from the perspective of the creditors.
First, since the Spanish Insolvency Act imposes harsher consequences in
liquidation than in reorganization, firms do not have incentives to
voluntary file for liquidation, even if a firm is not economically viable or
the business is economically attractive but the company is managed by the
wrong people. Moreover, as the creditors cannot force the liquidation of
the company or the sale of assets even if the debtor is not an economically
viable firm or they do not trust the shareholders/managers, value can be
destroyed.
Second, creditors do not enjoy some individual protections existing in
other countries to make sure that the assets are allocated efficiently. For
example, the Spanish Insolvency Act does not provide creditors with the
protection of the ‘best interest of creditor test’ existing in the US Chapter
29

See Aurelio Gurrea Martinez, EL DERECHO CONCURSAL EN
ESTRUCTURALES Y PROPUESTA DE REFORMA (Reus, 2018).
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11.30 Therefore, dissenting creditors can be forced to accept a plan even if
they prove that they would be better off under a piecemeal liquidation.
Third, the absolute priority rule is not strictly respected in Spain.
Therefore, the shareholders can get value out of the corporation even if the
creditors have not been paid in full. Fourth, unsecured creditors cannot
create a committee of creditors paid by the estate even if they think it
would be a valuable mechanism to protect their interest – especially in the
case of large bankruptcy procedures.
Finally, secured creditors can be subject to the opportunistic use of the
automatic stay by non-economically debtors, since the debtor´s viability is
not a requirement to use the stay. Moreover, unlike what happens in other
countries (e.g., USA), secured creditors who are stopped from enforcing
their claims cannot ask for adequate protection.
Therefore, even though the Spanish bankruptcy system is not very
appealing for debtors, it does not seem attractive for creditors either.

b. The efficiency of the mortgage system
Once a debtor becomes unable to pay their debts, creditors are allowed
to enforce their claims and seize the debtor´s assets. This process can be
made collectively through the use of bankruptcy procedures, or it can be
made individually by the creditors. When a claim is secured by a
mortgage, the creditor may choose an alternative venue for debt
enforcement: the mortgage system.
As shown in Table 2, the mortgage system is much faster than the
bankruptcy system in Spain. Therefore, secured creditors in Spain have
strong incentives to prefer the mortgage system. However, it should be
kept in mind that the mortgage system is not a perfect substitute of the
bankruptcy system. On the one hand, it is not a collective procedure.
Therefore, while the mortgage system can be preferred by an individual
(secured) creditor, it may make the creditors as a whole worse off since
going concern value (if any) can be lost. On the other hand, under Spanish
insolvency law, an insolvent debtor must file for bankruptcy even if its
main assets have been liquidated through the mortgage system or the
debtor initiated a voluntary dissolution process. Therefore, the use of the
mortgage system does not act as a real substitute to the bankruptcy
system.31
30

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2005)
For an analysis of the mortgage system as a debt enforcement mechanism in Spain, and
how it interacts with the bankruptcy system, see Marco Celentani, Miguel García-Posada
& Fernando Gómez, The Spanish Business Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis (FUNDACIÓN
DE ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA, Working Paper NO. 2010-11, Mar. 2010); Miguel
García-Posada, Insolvency Institutions and Efficiency: The Case of Spain (BANCO DE

31
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Table 2. Length of procedures of debt enforcement in 2007

Type of procedure

Spain

France

United Kingdom

Mortgage enforcements

7-9 months

15-25 months

8-12 months

Bankruptcy procedures

20-23 months

14 months

Less than 12 months

Source: Miguel García-Posada and Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, Are there alternatives to
bankruptcy? A study of small businesses distress in Spain, 5 J. OF THE SPANISH ECON.
ASS’N 287 (2014).

Besides, as it has been mentioned, while the use of the mortgage
system is more efficient for secured creditors, it is not costless from a
social welfare perspective. From an ex post perspective, it may destroy the
going concern value of economically viable firms. And if so, it will reduce
the pie available for distribution, harming firms’ access to debt finance.32
Likewise, the use of the mortgage system may generate various
inefficiencies ex ante. On the one hand, it may encourage firms to
overinvest in non-specific assets that can be easily used as debt collateral
such as equipment and real estate.33 Therefore, firms may reduce their
investments in innovation, research and other valuable assets.34
On the other hand, if the company´s assets are mainly given as debt
collateral, secured creditors will have high incentives to closely monitor
the firm. Therefore, while this behavior may reduce agency problems (and
particularly monitoring costs) between shareholders and managers, it will
ESPAÑA WORKING PAPERS NO. 1302, 2013); Miguel García-Posada & Juan S. MoraSanguinetti, Are there Alternatives to Bankruptcy? A Study of Small Businesses Distress in
Spain, 5 J. OF THE SPANISH ECON. ASS’N 287 (2014).
32
Analyzing the relationship between creditor protection and access to debt finance, see
supra note 12.
33
Miguel García-Posada, Insolvency Institutions and Efficiency: The Case of Spain
(BANCO DE ESPAÑA WORKING PAPERS NO. 1302, 2013).
34
Marco Celentani, Miguel García-Posada & Fernando Gómez, The Spanish Business
Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis (FUNDACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA,
Working Paper NO. 2010-11, Mar. 2010).
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likely encourage firms to bear a low level of risk since senior lenders
(unlike the shareholders) have incentives to be risk averse. Therefore,
firms may give up, at the expense of society, many projects with a high
positive net present value but high volatility.

c. Creditor-friendly corporate law
Corporate law can also reduce the risk of insolvency, particularly in
countries like Spain, where the law is very protective of the interests of the
creditors. Indeed, unlike other jurisdictions such as the United States,
where corporate law is mainly designed to maximize the interest of the
shareholders, Spanish corporate law is very creditor-oriented. This
orientation implies that, under some circumstances, the conflicts between
shareholders and creditors will be resolved in favor of the latter. For this
reason, Spanish corporate law has traditionally imposed several measures
to protect creditors, including: (i) a minimum legal capital; (ii) several
provisions regarding capital maintenance and distribution of dividends;
(iii) various provisions requiring creditors’ consent for certain corporate
transactions (e.g., mergers, reduction of capital, etc.); and (iv) the
imposition of personal liability for the corporate´s debts to those directors
that fail to promote the dissolution, restructuring or initiation of a
bankruptcy procedure within two months upon the company´s net assets
falling below 50% of the company´s legal capital.35 Therefore, these
provisions, and especially the last one, may serve as a powerful
mechanism to minimize the risk of insolvency, since firms will have less
incentives to use debt, especially taking into account that most companies
in Spain are small firms and they do not usually hire insurance for their
officers and directors.36 This reason may explain why, as shown in Table
3, Spanish companies have a higher capital ratio (equity/total assets) than
other European counterparties, as well as why Spain seem to have a lower

35

See article 367.1 of the Spanish Companies Act. Since 2005, however, these debts were
limited to those incurred by the corporation from the moment in which its net assets were
below 50% of the company´s legal capital. Before this reform, corporate directors were
personally liable for all the company’s debts.
36
Small and medium-sized enterprises represent 99.84% of the companies in Spain. See
https://industria.gob.es/eses/Servicios/MarcoEstrategicoPYME/Marco%20Estrat%C3%A9gico%20PYME.pdf.
Likewise, only 14% of small firms hire insurance for their officers and directors. See
https://cisscontablemercantil.ciss.es/Content/Documento.aspx?params=H4sIAAAAAAAE
AMtMSbF1jTAAAkNDcwMTC7Wy1KLizPw8WyMDQzNDIwNLkEBmWqVLfnJIZUGqbV
piTnGqWm5iSUlqka1zfl5JYlIOjO-dWmnr6xjiGuTpCADlFqEHVwAAAA==WKE
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proportion of balance-sheet insolvent firms than, for example, France,
Germany or the United Kingdom.37

Table 3. Capital Ratio (Equity/Total Assets)
SMEs

Total companies

Country/Year

2006

2011

2006

2011

Spain

40%

45%

37%

38%

Germany

32%

35%

31%

32%

France

32%

32%

32%

32%

Italy

26%

31%

29%

31%

Source: BACH, Outlook 1, SMEs in European countries, October 2013 (available at
https://www.bach.banque-france.fr/?page=archives)

Therefore, even if, as some authors have mentioned, some of these
creditor-oriented provisions do not clearly provide an effective protection
to creditors,38 they may reduce the risk of insolvency by incentivizing
firms to minimize the use of debt or by pursuing projects with lower
volatility. Moreover, by making the directors personally liable for the
company´s debts incurred after the company´s net assets fall below 50%
37

See Marco Celentani, Miguel García-Posada & Fernando Gómez, The Spanish Business
Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis 1 (FUNDACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA,
Working Paper NO. 2010-11, Mar. 2010). In fact, even in insolvency, many Spanish
companies seems to be balance-sheet solvent. Namely, according to Van Hemmen, 69.02%
of companies subject to a formal bankruptcy procedure in Spain in 2011 had positive net
assets. This percentage was similar in 2010, and even greater in 2009, when 86.6% of the
companies in bankruptcy have positive net assets. See Estefan Van Hemmen, Estadística
Concursal 2011: el Concurso de Acreedores en Cifras, 17-18 (COLEGIO DE
REGISTRADORES DE LA PROPIEDAD, BIENES MUEBLES Y MERCANTILES DE ESPAÑA 2012).
We must note, however, that these data reflect accounting values. Therefore, letting aside
the event of accounting fraud, it would be possible to find companies with positive net
assets on an accounting basis but balance-sheet insolvent on a market basis.
38
Luca Enriques and Jonathan Macey, Creditors Versos Capital Formation: The Case
Against The European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165, 1188 (2001); John
Armour, Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 5 (2006).
Moreover, it should be noted that professional lenders have the ability to protect
themselves, and many non-adjusting creditors (e.g., tort claimants and employees) are
properly protected under Spanish bankruptcy law, since they enjoy a preferential treatment
in the scheme of distribution.
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of the legal capital, the legislator also encourages many viable companies
reporting losses (which is actually the typical situation of many start-ups)
to leave the market. Therefore, in addition to contributing to the low rate
of business bankruptcies in Spain, this creditor-oriented corporate law can
harm entrepreneurship, innovation, access to finance and the survival of
viable companies temporarily reporting losses.

d. Secured transactions laws and practice
The law and practice of secured transactions existing in Spain may
also play a major role in the design of the asset and capital structures of
Spanish firms. Therefore, it may indirectly affect the risk of insolvency,
and ultimately the rate of business bankruptcies. On the one hand, the
system of secured transactions has not traditionally favored the use of nonfixed tangible assets as debt collateral. Therefore, Spanish firms have
based their asset structures toward real estate and other non-innovative
assets such as machinery.39 On the other hand, Spanish banks have
traditionally lent money on a secured (or over-secured) basis instead of
making their financial decisions based on the viability of a business
project. Therefore, this practice of bank lending, probably generated as a
result of poor creditor protection as well as the incentives or impositions
created by banking regulations (particularly compliance with Basel
Capital requirements), has exacerbated the problem associated with the
inefficient design of the asset structure of Spanish firms. Moreover, this
practice also encourages or, at least, allows banks to invest in negative net
present value projects provided that the debtor provides a collateral when
rejecting positive net present value projects just because a debtor is unable
to provide the lender with a security interest. Therefore, this practice of
bank lending also creates overinvestment and underinvestment
problems,40 respectively, which can be harmful for the efficient allocation
of resources in the economy. Therefore, not only are Spanish banks not
performing one of the key economic functions that justify their existence
(and part of their fees), which is financing value-creating projects and
39

See Marco Celentani, Miguel García-Posada & Fernando Gómez, The Spanish Business
Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis 1 (FUNDACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA,
Working Paper NO. 2010-11, Mar. 2010).
40
The concept of underinvestment projects refers to those situations in which a valuable
project cannot be pursued, usually due to the lack of finance. See Stewart C. Myers &
Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: When Firms Have
Information the Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. OF FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). By contrast, the
concept of ‘overinvestment’ refers to those situations in which projects with a negative net
present value are being financed. See Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, & Franklin
Allen, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. FINANCE 291 (MCGRAW-HILL IRWIN, 4TH ED, 2011).

292

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

Vol. 27:2

rejecting value-destroying projects,41 but they are also incentivizing firms
to have inefficient asset structures.

e. Labor laws
Some previous studies have shown some correlation between
bankruptcy rates and labor laws.42 Namely, it has been shown that a rigid
labor law encourages firms to be more risk-averse due to the higher costs
of hiring and firing employees, as well as the lack of flexibility in scenarios
of financial trouble. Therefore, rigid labor laws, as Spain has traditionally
had,43 may reduce the risk of insolvency.

IV. ENHANCING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS IN SPAIN
a. The need for a structural reform of the Spanish Insolvency
Act
As it has been argued in this paper, the low usage of bankruptcy
procedures in Spain may generate several costs. When the risk of
bankruptcy is minimized ex ante, it may encourage Spanish firms to make
suboptimal financial decisions, and it may reduce the level of
entrepreneurship and innovation in the country. Likewise, when
bankruptcy procedures are avoided ex post, once a situation of insolvency
already threatens, the typical alternatives to bankruptcy are mechanisms
that often destroy going concern value. Therefore, since the pie available
for the creditors will be reduced, these alternatives can ultimately lead to
an increase in the cost of debt in the country.

41

See John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Colin
Mayer, & Jennifer Payne, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 275, 287 (OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016) (pointing out that the primary function of a bank is to lend
money. However, since many other institutions do so, what distinguishes the lending
activity of banks is the screening and overseeing the performance of loans). See also
Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. OF
ECON. STUD. 393 (1984).
42
Stijn Claessens & Leora F. Klapper, Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of Its
Relative Use, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 253, 275 (2005).
43
For an overview of the labor regime in Spain and how in the past years, see ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE 2012 LABOUR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN: A
PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT
(2013),
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/SpainLabourMarketReform-Report.pdf.
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In my opinion, the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 reflects a lack of
understanding of the economics of bankruptcy and the impact that an
insolvency regime may have on people’s access to finance, the asset and
capital structure of firms, and the promotion of economic growth. For this
reason, the Spanish Insolvency Act needs several reforms to enhance the
attractiveness of insolvency proceedings for both debtors and creditors.
First, the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 should implement an effective
discharge of debts for honest but unfortunate individual debtors.44 This
discharge should certainly be limited to debtors in good faith. However,
once a debtor enters into the system, most of their debts should be
dischargeable within a short period of time. Thus, bankruptcy law could
provide—as it should—a form of insurance for individual debtors in order
to favor entrepreneurship, economic growth, and the fresh start of honest
but unfortunate debtors.45
Second, directors of Spanish companies are subject to one of the
world´s harshest liability regimes toward creditors. Moreover, the
directors of small and medium size firms in Spain are not usually covered
by insurance. Therefore, they have even more incentives to be risk averse.
For this reason, in addition to encouraging corporate directors to use
insurance, the Spanish legislator should soften the liability regime of
corporate directors existing in bankruptcy. For that purpose, a liability for
wrongful trading (as it currently exists in the United Kingdom under
section 214 of the Insolvency Act) may constitute a reasonable model to
be implemented in Spain.46
Third, secured creditors should be allowed to ask for adequate
protection when they are oversecured – that is, when the value of their
44

Under Spanish Bankruptcy Law, preferential claims, public claims, and secured debts
(among others) are not dischargeable debts. See article 178 bis of the Spanish Insolvency
Act. For an analysis of the discharge of debts under Spanish Bankruptcy Law, see Fernando
Gómez, La segunda oportunidad del deudor persona individual en Derecho español y el
Real Directo-Ley 1/2015, 40 ACTUALIDAD JURÍDICA URÍA MENÉNDEZ 52 (2015). For a
proposal to implement an effective discharge of debts in Spain, see Matilde Cuena Casas,
Ley de emprendedores y exoneración de deudas o fresh start, 31 ANUARIO DE DERECHO
CONCURSAL 123 (2014). For an analysis of the fresh start policy in Spain and other
jurisdictions, see Santiago Senent, Exoneración del pasivo insatisfecho y concurso de
acreedores,
UNIVERSIDAD
COMPLUTENSE
DE
MADRID
(2015),
http://eprints.sim.ucm.es/28133/1/T35661.pdf.
45
See Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23
J.L., ECON. & ORG. 161 (2007); John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and
Entrepreneurship, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 303 (2008).
46
For an analysis of this model, see Rizwaan J. Mokal, An Agency Cost Analysis of the
Wrongful Trading Provisions: Redistribution, Perverse Incentives, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 335 (2000); Paul Davies, Directors’ Creditor-Regarding
Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 7 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 301 (2006).
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collateral is higher than the value of their claim. Otherwise, they should
be allowed to lift the automatic stay unless it is proved that the encumbered
assets affected by their collateral: (i) are essential to the primary business
of the corporation (as it is provided in the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003);
and (ii) are necessary for an effective reorganization. If this latter
condition is not required, many companies in economic distress may use
the automatic stay just to opportunistically postpone their liquidation, and
value can be destroyed for the creditors. Thereby, secured creditors may
respond ex ante by increasing the cost of debt to every debtor in the market.
Moreover, since the lack of adequate protection and the inefficient
allocation of the debtor´s assets in bankruptcy may harm the lenders’
assets and solvency, they will probably be required by the regulator to
register those losses associated with the impairment of their claims. Hence,
they will have more incentives to avoid the use of bankruptcy procedures
since these losses may harm their financial statements. Therefore, a greater
protection to secured creditors in bankruptcy may not only lead to an
overall reduction in the cost of debt but it can also make secured lenders
less reluctant to use bankruptcy procedures.
Fourth, the lack of a clear absolute priority rule in Spanish Insolvency
Law also makes creditors more reluctant to the use of bankruptcy
procedures. According to the absolute priority rule, senior creditors (e.g.,
creditors with a higher priority outside of bankruptcy) must be paid first,
and only when they have been paid in full (or they have accepted not to be
paid in full), junior creditors can get something. Similarly, until junior
creditors have not been paid in full, shareholders are not allowed to get
anything. However, under Spanish Insolvency Law, shareholders can still
get something (at the very least, the property of the company´s shares in
the reorganized firm), even when some creditors have not been paid in full.
This violation of the absolute priority rule may encourage professional
lenders to increase the cost of debt, and it will make every creditor more
reluctant to the use of bankruptcy procedures.47 If the creditors think a
47

For a seminal work analyzing the ex-ante costs of violating the absolute priority rule, see
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Ex Ante Costs of Violating the Absolute Priority Rule, 57 THE J.
OF FIN. 445 (2002). Arguing, however, that a violation of the absolute priority rule may
generate some benefits, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Randal Picker, Bankruptcy Rules,
Managerial Entrenchments, and Firm-Specific Human Capital, LAW & ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPER NO 16, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL (1993) (arguing that it may
encourage investments in non-specific human capital); Douglas Baird, The Initiation
Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 223 (1991) (arguing it may
incentivize filing for bankruptcy at a timely manner); Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein,
A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization law, 46 J. OF FIN. 1189 (1991)
(arguing that it can discourage excessive risk taking of financially distressed firms); Eli
Berkovitch, Ronen Israel & Jaime Zender, The Design of bankruptcy Law: A Case for
Management Bias in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, J. OF FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 441
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deviation of the absolute priority rule can generate value (for example,
because the shareholders/managers can keep running the company, and
they can add value with their knowledge and experience), they should have
incentives to authorize these deviations. Therefore, the hypothetical
inefficiencies ex post generated by a violation of the absolute priority rule
would not even exist. As a result, if the possibility of violating the absolute
priority rule may create several costs ex ante, and it does not generate any
clear gain ex post, there are more reasons to be in favor of this rule.
Fifth, unlike other jurisdictions where unsecured creditors are
protected by either the imposition of a general duty on the trustee to
maximize the returns to unsecured creditors, or by the creation of a
committee of unsecured creditors funded by the bankruptcy estate, the
Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 does not provide any mechanism to
effectively protect unsecured creditors. They should just rely on the trustee
and its ability to pursue the unclear concept of the ‘interest of the
bankruptcy procedure’.48 And if the trustee fails to fulfill its duties and it
causes any damage to either the bankruptcy estate (and therefore the
creditors as a whole) or to any individual creditor, they are allowed to sue
the trustee for damages. In my opinion, the creation of a committee of
unsecured creditors may not be needed in those procedures with a low
number of unsecured creditors. In these cases, the creation of this
committee may do more harm than good. Likewise, a general duty to
maximize the returns to unsecured creditors, rather than a duty to
maximize the value of the insolvent firm, may sometimes generate
perverse incentives to redistribute assets from secured to unsecured
creditors, or even to subordinate otherwise unsecured creditors. For that
reason, none of these measures should be imposed in the Spanish
Insolvency Act 2013 as a general rule. However, I think the law should
allow the creation of a committee of unsecured creditors funded by the
estate in the case of large bankruptcy procedures. Thus, this measure
would allow unsecured creditors to have a better level of information about
both the debtor (e.g., valuation or viability) and the procedure (e.g. stage,
costs, trustees). Moreover, since the creation of the committee would not

(1998) (arguing that deviations from the absolute priority rule may help solve the
underinvestment problem potentially faced by a financially distressed firm with debt
overhang).
48
For an analysis of this concept, see Ignacio Tirado, El «interés concursal»: Ensayo de
construcción de una teoría sobre la finalidad del procedimiento concursal, 62 ANUARIO
DE DERECHO CIVIL 90 (2009); Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, Tendencias Actuales en la
configuración del interés del concurso, in Ángel Rojo & Ana Campuzano, ESTUDIOS
JURÍDICOS EN MEMORIA DEL PROFESOR EMILIO BELTRÁN: LIBER AMICORUM, 1523–1545
(Tirant lo blanch, Vol. 2, 2015).
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be mandatory, it will likely exist only in those cases in which it can be in
the interest of unsecured creditors.
Sixth, public creditors enjoy a preferential status in the ranking of
claims under Spanish Insolvency Law. In my opinion, despite the shortterm benefits for the Spanish Treasury created by this statutory priority for
public creditors, there are strong arguments for its abolition. On the one
hand, it reduces the recoveries of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. In
fact, in some scenarios, this reduction may even trigger the bankruptcy
procedure of many unsecured creditors –especially those more exposed to
the debtor’s bankruptcy. On the other hand, there are no persuasive
arguments to favor public creditors over private lenders. In fact, quite the
opposite: since public creditors are usually in a better position in terms of
information, legal advice and access to finance, it would seem reasonable
to improve the position of unsecured creditors with respect to public
creditors. Therefore, following the examples of Australia and the United
Kingdom,49 the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 should abolish or, at least,
reduce the preferential treatment of public claimants in bankruptcy. This
would likely best serve the public interest.
Seventh, according to the preface of the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003,
the primary role of Spanish bankruptcy procedures is to maximize
creditors’ returns. However, the Spanish legislature does not seem to be
consistent with this goal. As it is expressly stated in the preface,
reorganization is the ‘normal solution’ of the single-entry Spanish
bankruptcy procedure, and several aspects of the Insolvency Act 2003
support this idea. For instance, the law imposes harsher consequences to
the debtor when the procedure ends up in liquidation. Therefore, it
incentivizes reorganization over liquidation even if the debtor is not
economically viable. Moreover, unless firms state otherwise, the
procedure is initiated (and followed) as a reorganization procedure, even
if the firm is not economically viable. In my opinion, this preference for
reorganization over the liquidation may create several costs.50 Ex ante, it

49

The abolition of tax priorities in Australia was proposed in the Harmer Report in 1988
and it was implemented in 1997. In the United Kingdom, the Enterprise Act 2002 removed
the Crown priorities traditionally existing in the UK Bankruptcy Law. For an international
comparison of tax priorities in bankruptcy, see Barbara K. Morgan B, Should the Sovereign
Be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in
Bankruptcy, 74 AMERICAN BANKR. L. J. 461 (2000). Explaining the reform of tax priorities
in Australia and the United Kingdom, see Christopher F. Symes, Reminiscing thee Taxation
Priorities in Insolvency, 2 J. OF THE AUSTRALASIAN TAX TCHR. ASS’N. 435 (2005); John
Duns and John Glover, The Taxation Priority in Insolvency: An Australian Perspective, 14
INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 171 (2005).
50
See Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, La Incomprensible Preferencia del Convenio a la
Liquidación Como Solución del Concurso de Acreedores [The Incomprehensible

2020

THE LOW USAGE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES

297

will encourage ‘lemons’ (i.e., economically distressed firms) to either try
to reach an agreement or to opportunistically postpone the length of the
bankruptcy procedure. And if so, value can be destroyed ex post at the
expense of creditors. Therefore, lenders will have incentive to both
increase the cost of debt and be more reluctant to the use of bankruptcy
procedures. Ex post, this preference for reorganization over liquidation
may create perverse incentives to try to reach a reorganization plan even
in those circumstances in which a company can be worth more in a
piecemeal liquidation. For that reason, the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003
should be amended in order to provide a neutral solution of the bankruptcy
procedure. In my view, the preface of the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003
should mention both solutions as normal way-outs of the procedure, and,
depending on the type of problem potentially faced by the debtor (e.g.,
economic distress or just financial distress), one solution may be preferred
over the other. Moreover, both solutions should lead to the same
consequences for the debtor (or corporate directors) in terms of personal
liability.
Eighth, the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 requires debtors to submit
many documents in order to file for bankruptcy (art. 6 LC). However, it
misses, in my opinion, the most important one: a valuation of the
company´s assets as a going concern and in a piecemeal liquidation. This
valuation would allow bankruptcy actors to quickly identify those
companies in economic distress. The valuation could thereby save those
costs associated with postponing the liquidation of non-economically
viable companies. Likewise, it can also help identify, in a timely manner,
those businesses (or business units) that should be preserved as a going
concern either as a reorganized firm or through a liquidation/sale of assets.
Moreover, since the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 does not provide
different procedures for potentially viable firms that should be reorganized
(e.g., the US Chapter 11 or the UK Administration) and potentially nonviable firms that should be liquidated (e.g., the US Chapter 7 or the UK
Winding-Up), it will be difficult to distinguish between those firms that
deserve to be reorganized and those that do not, at least at an early stage
of the procedure. For that reason, and also taking into account that a
liquidation implies harsher consequences for the debtor, there will likely
be many ‘lemons’ trying to reach a reorganization agreement. In my
opinion, companies credibly seeking to be reorganized should submit a
valuation of the company´s asset as a going concern and in a piecemeal
liquidation as soon as possible. Otherwise, creditors may reasonably
believe that the company is under economic (rather than just financial)
Preference for the Reorganization over the Liquidation as the 'Way Out' of Spanish
Insolvency Proceedings] (Working Paper, 2014).
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distress. However, as preparing these valuations can delay the filing, an
alternative solution to solve this ‘lemon problem’ is the implementation of
a double (or multiple) entry bankruptcy procedures as it used to exist in
Spain before the enactment of the Insolvency Act 2003, and it also exists
in most insolvency jurisdictions around the world (e.g., Australia,
Singapore, the UK, the US, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Italy). Thus, by
allowing the use of the reorganization procedure only to those companies
which, in theory, are economically viable and just face financial trouble,
the ‘lemon problem’ would be reduced at an early stage. Nevertheless, as
many non-viable firms may still file for the reorganization procedure as a
result of many factors (including lack of knowledge about the viability of
the business, behavioral factors or even bad faith), some sanctions should
be imposed to those debtors seeking reorganization when the company is
clearly in economic distress.
Ninth, the costs of filing for bankruptcy is very high in Spain. In
addition to the indirect costs associated with filing for bankruptcy, and the
fees charged by both lawyers and accountants, companies have to submit
many documents detailing the history, share structure, financial situation,
and many other aspects of the company, including financial statements
from the past 3 years (art. 6 LC). Moreover, they have to convince the
court that they are unable to pay their debts as they become due, or, at
least, they will become unable to do so in a short period of time (art. 2.3
LC). In my opinion, the requirements in the bankruptcy petition should be
reduced,51 and several arguments seem to suggest the abolition of any
financial requirement to file for bankruptcy. First, the proof of financial
requirements may delay the petition of an economically viable firm facing
financial trouble –especially, when the proof of the insolvency involves
judicial control ex ante. Second, the existence of bankruptcy costs should
reasonably act as a powerful mechanism to constrain debtors’ misbehavior
in the filing. Therefore, solvent debtors not facing any type of financial
trouble should not have incentives to file for bankruptcy. Third, the court
may examine ex post if there was any ‘bankruptcy reason’ to justify the
filing. If not, some sanctions could be imposed (e.g., liability for damages,
litigation costs, etc.). Therefore, there are no convincing reasons to impose
a control ex ante, especially taking into account that the review of the
petition and the commencement of the insolvency proceeding may take
months in Spain. As a result, many viable companies may become nonviable during this process, and both viable and non-viable companies may
be subject to other costs of financial distress. Thus, value can be destroyed
at the expense of creditors, employees, and society as a whole.

51

The implementation of a form with the most relevant information may be a solution.
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Tenth, trustees are appointed at the discretion of the court among a
‘qualified’ list of candidates. Unlike a system of randomly appointed
trustees, the current system presents a clear advantage: it allows the
appointment of the most qualified professionals for a particular type of
debtor. However, the existence of high fees in large bankruptcy procedures
may create perverse incentives in the nomination process. In fact, there
have been some cases in Spain in which judges have been accused of being
directly or indirectly bribed by insolvency practitioners seeking to be
nominated in large bankruptcy cases.52 Therefore, regardless of the
truthfulness of these allegations, creditors and debtors might be reluctant
to trust the system. For this reason, the current system should be amended
in different ways. First, trustees should be subject to higher standards of
qualifications and expertise, especially in economics, business and
finance.53 As stated above, a key role of the trustee should be the quick
detection of viable or a non-viable firms. And this ability requires a strong
background in economics and finance. Therefore, trustees should be
highly qualified professionals, and they should prove this level of expertise
by passing a public exam testing a variety of areas of law, economics,
accounting and finance. Second, if all insolvency practitioners are
supposed to have a license which requires passing a complex exam and
various years of experience, the risk of appointing a non-qualified trustee
will be much lower. Third, in exceptional circumstances (for example, in
cases involving debtors with very complex businesses), the court should
have the discretion to appoint the trustee from among the ‘qualified’ list
of candidates. In these cases, however, the court should be subject to
higher standards of justification and disclosure. Finally, the creditors
should be allowed to remove the trustee appointed by the court. Thus, not
only the creditors - as the primary beneficiaries of the procedures- will be
ultimately able to choose the person who is going to manage their interest,
but this system will also create better incentives for the judges to appoint

52

For a brief video, see Administradores concursales, bajo sospecha, LA SEXTA (May 23,
2014),
https://www.lasexta.com/programas/equipoinvestigacion/noticias/administradores-concursalessospecha_2014052357264b356584a81fd883f7cf.html. For news stories, see Carlos
Hernanz, Investigan a jueces de lo Mercantil por la adjudicación de concursus de
acreedores,
EL
CONFIDENCIAL
(June
7,
2011
at
2:09PM),
https://www.elconfidencial.com/empresas/2011-06-07/investigan-a-jueces-de-lomercantil-por-la-adjudicacion-de-concursos-de-acreedores_249944/; Jose María Mur, El
juez del caso Banco Madrid se lucró de cursos organizados por el administrador
concursal, IBERCAMPUS.ES (June 1, 2015), https://www.ibercampus.es/el-juez-del-casobanco-madrid-se-lucro-de-cursos-organizados-30446.htm.
53
These higher standards of qualification may include the approval of an exam, as it
happens in the United Kingdom, or even in Spain for other professions (e.g., auditors).
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the most qualified candidates in the exceptional cases of appointing a
trustee at the discretion of the court.
Eleventh, Spanish bankruptcy procedures are very formalistic and lack
the flexibility needed to successful manage a bankruptcy procedure. On the
one hand, the lack of flexibility in the reorganization plan may hamper the
efficient resolution of financial distress. On the other hand, the excessive
intervention of both the court and the trustee in the debtor´s operation may
increase the length (and therefore costs) of bankruptcy procedures. In my
opinion, the intervention of the court should be limited to a very few cases
(e.g., approval of the reorganization plan, disqualification of directors,
etc.). Indeed, in a system with a court-appointed trustee, this latter actor
(rather than the court) should assume, along with the debtor, the main role
in the bankruptcy procedure. Otherwise, it would be more desirable to
implement a debtor in possession directly supervised (for some relevant
decisions) by the court, as it happens in the United States, and several costs
would be avoided. In my view, unless otherwise provided by the trustee,
the debtor should be allowed to act almost as a debtor in possession, and
the trustee should fulfill some of the functions currently played by the
court. Thus, by switching part of the functions currently played by the
court and the trustee in favor of the trustee and the debtor, respectively,
and by increasing the autonomy of debtors and creditors to agree to the
terms of the reorganization plan, Spanish bankruptcy procedures could
become faster and more efficient.54 Likewise, by preserving the trustee as
a ‘gatekeeper’ of the debtor´s operation, the risk of opportunism of
shareholders vis-à-vis creditors would be lower than in a system of debtor
in possession.
Twelfth, while an efficient insolvency framework should make sure
that the debtor´s assets are put to their best use, the Spanish Bankruptcy
Law does not currently promote this goal. For this reason, various
measures should be implemented to achieve the efficient allocation of the
debtor´s assets. First, the Spanish Insolvency Act 2003 should implement
a best interest of creditor test as a way to protect individual creditors from
being subject to the imposition of an inefficient reorganization plan.
According to this test recognized in §1129(a)(7)) of the US Bankruptcy
Code, any creditor is allowed to challenge the approval of a reorganization
plan when it is shown that an event of liquidation would make the creditor
better off.55 Second, the trustee should have the duty, and not just the
54

Moreover, this reduction in the workload of the bankruptcy court would also be
beneficial for other Spanish commercial procedures, since bankruptcy courts in Spain are
also in charge of other commercial matters (corporate disputes, intellectual property,
commercial contracts, maritime law, etc.).
55
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129. (a)(7)(A)(ii). The US Bankruptcy Code does not mention,
however, that the value of the companies should be compared with the value of the
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ability,56 to promote the liquidation of the debtor´s assets when a
company´s business has ceased during (or prior to) the bankruptcy
procedure. Otherwise, the debtor may have perverse incentives to
postpone liquidation, even when, under these circumstances, there might
be no chances to turn around the company. Third, the creditors should be
allowed to force the liquidation of the debtor´s assets whenever the trustee
reveals, normally in its report, that the company is economically
inviable.57 Thus, the creditors could act as additional ‘gatekeepers’ to
prevent, in the interest of society, an inefficient allocation of the debtor´s
assets.
Thirteenth, in order to avoid holdout problems and facilitates the quick
approval of reorganization plans, Spain should implement a system of
cross-class cramdown for the approval of reorganization plans. Under this
system, imported from the US Chapter 11, the approval of a single class
of creditors would be enough to approve a reorganization plan. Once a
class approves the plan, this can be imposed on some dissenting classes of
creditors, provided that several conditions are met. Among these
conditions, the plan cannot discriminate unfairly, and it has to be “fair and
equitable.” Likewise, as a way to ensure that the plan maximizes the
returns to the creditors, the plan should provide the creditors with the
ability to challenge the plan if they show that they can be better off in
liquidation. Therefore, the best interest of creditor test would also protect
individual creditors from the approval of an inefficient plan.
Fourteenth, Spanish Insolvency law allows the avoidance of any
harmful transactions for the debtor´s assets entered into by a debtor within
two years prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy procedure.
Moreover, it does not require the proof of any financial requirement to
allow the avoidance of the transaction. In my opinion, this system of
avoiding powers is very unattractive for legal certainty, since parties –
even in good faith- cannot be sure if a transaction that they are entering
into may be avoided at some point in the future. As a result, several
reforms seem to be needed. First, the underlying rationale of avoidance
actions is to prevent (ex ante) or to resolve (ex post) the misalignment of
incentives between a factually insolvent debtor and its creditors, since the
latter becomes the residual claimants of the firm but they do not have any
control over the debtor´s assets while the company is not yet subject to a
company in a piecemeal liquidation. Supporting the view of the value of the reorganized
firm should be compared with the value of a hypothetical orderly piecemeal liquidation,
however, see In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 B.R. 279, 287 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.1990).
56
See art. 142 of the Insolvency Act 2003. Before 2011, the trustee did not event have the
ability to propose the liquidation when the debtor has ceased in its operations.
57
This situation will usually take place in firms with negative cash-flows.
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bankruptcy procedure. Therefore, a company should be insolvent at the
moment of entering into the transaction. Otherwise, companies should be
free to dispose their assets as they wish provided that there is no bad faith.
Nevertheless, since the proof of this financial requirement may increase
litigation costs, unless otherwise is shown by the debtor or its counterparty,
it seems reasonable to assume that the debtor was insolvent within the
‘twilight period.’ Second, the concept of ‘harm’ required to avoid a
transaction should be clarified. Right now, it is not clear whether it refers
to the debtor´s net assets (and therefore the creditors as a whole) or
whether it also includes those transactions that may harm the creditors
among themselves. Finally, I also think the use of avoiding powers should
be limited to those situations in which the debtor´s assets are not enough
to pay all its creditors, that is, when the debtor is balance-sheet insolvent
on a market basis. However, since the valuation may differ across time and
among experts, I would propose to leave a cushion of assets over the
debtor´s liabilities (e.g., 15-20%), as a way to prevent that, in the event of
liquidation, the company´s assets may become, at some point, lower than
the company´s liabilities. If this financial requirement is not required at
the moment of exercising the action, the use of avoiding powers would
only be beneficial for the shareholders (since the creditors are supposed to
be paid in full), and therefore the use of avoiding powers not only can
create moral hazard but it can also imply an unjust enrichment for the
shareholders at the expense of the debtor´s (potentially good faith)
counterparty.
Fifteenth, the old-fashion system of ‘labelling’ debtors existing in
Spanish Insolvency law should be abolished or at least deeply. In my
opinion, the existence of this ‘label’ just contributes to preserve the stigma
generally associated with bankruptcy procedures without providing any
benefits for the system.58 Ex ante, the existence of this system of labelling
debtors may discourage entrepreneurship, responsible risk-taking, the use
of debt, and it may make debtors more reluctant to the use of bankruptcy
procedures postponing the initiation of insolvency proceedings once it
might be too late to reorganize viable but financially distressed companies.
Ex post, it may hamper the rehabilitation of many honest but unfortunate
debtors and corporate directors that just failed to comply with some
regulatory provisions. Moreover, the ‘label’ of a debtor as ‘guilty’ even
58

Proposing the abolition or, alternatively, a structural reform of this historical institution
existing in Spanish Bankruptcy Law, see Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, La incomprensible
vigencia de la sección de calificación en el Derecho concursal español del siglo XXI [The
incomprehensible survival of the classification of the insolvency proceeding in the Spanish
Insolvency Law of the 21st century] (Ibero-American Institute for Law and Finance,
Working
Paper
No.
1/2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710117.
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when it is even shown that the situation of insolvency was generated or
aggravated fortuitously,59 may even be controversial from the perspective
of the debtor´s dignity. For that reason, I propose the abolition or, if so,
structural reform of this historical institution traditionally existing in
Spanish Insolvency law. This abolition, however, should not imply the
lack of sanctions for misbehavior or even fraudulent conducts prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy procedure. In my opinion, these
sanctions should be kept, but the imposition of these sanctions does not
need any prior ‘labelling’ process. Besides, they should be imposed during
any stage of the bankruptcy procedure and, of course, regardless of the
solution potentially achieved by the debtor (reorganization or liquidation).
Otherwise, the existence of these sanctions may create perverse incentives
to opportunistically design the bankruptcy procedure with the purpose of
avoiding these sanctions instead of doing whatever it can be best for the
creditors and society as a whole.

b. Reform of non-bankruptcy laws
This paper has shown that some non-bankruptcy laws may also affect
the risk of insolvency, and therefore the rate of business bankruptcies.
First, it has been argued that the creditor-friendly corporate law existing
in Spain, and particularly the rules regarding minimum capital and capital
maintenance (including the liability of directors to promote the
dissolution, restructuring or bankruptcy whenever the company´s assets
fall below 50% of the legal capital), may harm innovation,
entrepreneurship and access to finance. Moreover, they do not even protect
creditors effectively. In my opinion, the minimum legal capital required
for private companies should be abolished, at least as a mandatory rule.
Instead, if the legislator wants to encourage firms to have more capital,
Spain could allow the tax deductibility of an implied cost of equity, as it
was implemented with great success in Belgium in 2005.60
59

For an analysis of this situation, see Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, La Calificación Culpable
Del Concurso Por Errores E Incumplimientos Contables 33–40 (Thomson Reuters, 2016).
See also Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, Hacia la supresión de la calificación del concurso, 28
Revista de derecho concursal y paraconcursal 107 (2018).
60
In a tax reform enacted in 2005, Belgium introduced the possibility of also deducting
taxes for the use of equity (déduction pour capital à risque or intérêts notionnels). The
deduction is based on the concept of “notional interest”, which is calculated as an implied
cost of equity. For an analysis of this reform and its comparison with other measures and
jurisdictions seeking to promote the equal use of debt and equity, see Ernesto Zangari,
Addressing the Debt Bias: A Comparison between the Belgian and the Italian ACE
Systems, (Eur. Comm’n Taxation Papers, Paper No. 44-2014, 2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_a
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Second, the Spanish legislator should also amend its secured
transaction laws to favor the use of non-fixed tangible assets as debt
collateral. Thus, not only will it be easier for firms to have access to
finance, but this reform will also incentivize firms to choose the asset
structure based on what may seem more appropriate for their business
model, regardless of how attractive this asset structure may be from the
perspective of the lender.
Third, the culture of bank lending in Spain can also generate several
costs. Indeed, since lending decisions are primarily based on the ability of
the debtor to provide a collateral rather than on the viability of an
investment project, various inefficiencies can be created. On the one hand,
banks can be financing value-destroying projects. On the other, banks may
not be financing value-creating ventures. To minimize these problems,
several measures can be implemented. Firstly, Spain should amend its
secured transactions laws to promote the use of all types of assets as debt
collateral.61 Secondly, capital requirements for banks should not punish
financing debtors that, while unable to provide a collateral, show a high
likelihood of success in their investment projects. Likewise, they should
not discourage the use of certain collaterals over others, provided that they
all have the same quality. Unless these banking rules are amended, banks
will still have incentives to request (or over-request) certain collaterals.
Finally, while the Spanish legislator has recently implemented several
reforms to make the labor market more flexible,62 labor laws are still very
rigid in Spain. Therefore, the implementation of more flexible labor laws
nalysis/tax_papers/taxation_paper_44.pdf. For an empirical investigation of the effects of
this reform, see Frédéric Panier, Francisco Pérez-Gonzáles, & Pablo Villanueva, Capital
Structure and Taxes: What Happens When You (Also) Subsidize Equity? (2015) (working
paper), https://www.bis.org/events/confresearchnetwork1603/perez_gonzalez.pdf. For a
general discussion about the impact of the tax benefits of debt on the capital structure of
firms, see Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The impact of the tax benefits of debt on the capital
structure of firms and the stability of the financial system, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG, (Mar.
30,
2017),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/03/impact-taxbenefits-debt-capital-structure-firms-and-stability.
61
Some steps have been taken at a regulatory level to promote the modernization of the
system of secured transactions in Spain. However, many efforts should be still done to
modernize the Spanish system of secured transactions in term of both legislation and
especially culture. For a further analysis of the situation and the modernization of the law
of secured transactions in Spain, see Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell & Jorge Feliu
Rey, Modernization of the Law of Secured Transactions in Spain, in SECURED
TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES & PRACTICES (Louise Gullifer &
Orkun Akseli eds., Hart Publishing, 2016).
62
See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE 2012 LABOUR MARKET
REFORM
IN
SPAIN:
A
PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT
(2013),
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/SpainLabourMarketReform-Report.pdf
(providing
an
overview of labor reforms that took place in Spain in 2012 and how it made the labor
market more flexible).
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may help Spanish firms become less risk averse, facilitating innovation,
entrepreneurship and competitiveness.

c. Improving the academic and policy debate
The law and finance literature has traditionally focused on the impact
that laws and institutions may have on a variety of factors, including
investor protection and firms’ access to finance. However, they have
omitted a factor that, in my opinion, may affect both the law on the books
and the quality of the enforcement. In my opinion, this missing gap in the
law and finance literature is the role of legal scholars, and more generally
the quality of an academic and policy debate in a country.
Firstly, legal scholars have the ability to train future lawyers, judges
and other legal actors. Therefore, not only they have the ability to
influence their education, but also do they way they face legal problems.
Secondly, legal scholars in many countries are involved in policy reforms.
This is particularly relevant in Spain, where there is a commission—the
Comisión General de Codificación—mainly formed by senior legal
scholars providing advice to the Ministry of Justice on legal reforms and
has been in charge of drafting some laws, including the Spanish
Insolvency Act 2003. Thirdly, legal scholars have the ability (or inability)
to generate new ideas and policy recommendations that, by improving the
legal and institutional framework, can improve people’s welfare.
Obviously, writing an academic article is not enough for this goal.
Nevertheless, if the article is accompanied by a series of initiatives to
spread the policy recommendations – for example, through public
presentations, blog posts, and other mechanisms– it can make a different,
since more people can be aware of these new ideas, and different
stakeholders –or even the Government itself- can then push for a legal
reform.
However, in order for legal scholars to fulfil these goals in society,
they need to be innovative in their legal research and suggest policy
recommendations that can improve people’s welfare. Unfortunately, legal
scholarship in Spain, as in many other countries, is mainly descriptive, just
focused on what the law is and not on what the law should be.63 So while
63

Gabriel Doménech-Pascual, Que innoven ellos: Por qué la ciencia juridica española es
tan poco original, creative e innovadora, 2 Indret (2016); Aurelio Gurrea Martínez,
Implicaciones económicas de la falta de innovación de la academia juridica española, 72
El Notario del Siglo XXI 64, 64-71 (2017); Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The Impact of Legal
Scholars on People’s Welfare: A Critical Analysis about the Role of Legal Scholars Using
the Experience of the Colombian Simplified Stock Corporation as a Paradigm of Legal
Innovation, in THE SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATION: INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA, 107–
133 (Francisco Reyes Villamizar ed., 2018). This problem, however, does not seem to be
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this type of legal scholarship can be very useful for students and practicing
lawyers, it can be very harmful to promote legal changes that can
ultimately enhance people´s welfare. For that reason, another nonbankruptcy reform potentially suggested to improve the legal and
institutional framework in Spain is the promotion of more empirical,
interdisciplinary and policy-oriented legal research.

d. Final thoughts: laws vs culture
Even though the reforms suggested in the previous sections may
enhance the attractiveness of the legal and institutional framework for
debtors and creditors in Spain, it may take time for the business
community to absorb the new ideas implemented in a new regulatory
framework. Sometimes, the institutional framework may have created a
perception or even a “cultural problem”. And if that is the case – which is
something that this article does not explore- it might take time to get rid of
this culture. In any case, amending the regulatory framework is the first
step for this change. Then, additional efforts of awareness and capacity
building will be needed to make sure that the business community
becomes familiar with the principles, philosophy and provisions existing
in the new legal framework.

V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the low usage of the bankruptcy system in
Spain is not due to a cultural problem but to an institutional one. Namely,
it has argued that the low rate of business bankruptcies in Spain is better
explained by the unattractiveness of the Spanish insolvency system, as
well as other legal and institutional factors including a creditor-friendly
corporate law, an efficient mortgage system, a rigid labor law, and a poor
law of secured transactions. All these factors encourage both debtors and
creditors to avoid the use of insolvency proceedings either by minimizing
ex ante the risk of insolvency or by postponing ex post the use of the
bankruptcy system once a debtor becomes insolvent. By providing a better
understanding of why Spanish debtors might not use the bankruptcy
exclusive of Spain. In Italy, see Luca Amorello & Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, The
Responsibility of Legal Scholars in the Italian Banking Crisis, Diritto Bancario (March 7,
2017), http://www.dirittobancario.it/approfondimenti/crisi-bancarie/responsibility-legalscholars-italian-banking-crisis. In France, see Sophie Vermeille, Mathieu Kohmann &
Mathieu Luinaud, French Institutions, Innovation, and Growth (May 9, 2016) (Working
Paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760089.
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system, this paper seeks to contribute to the general understanding of the
use and attractiveness of insolvency proceedings around the world, as well
as the economic implications potentially associated with a low usage of
bankruptcy procedures.

